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The “Childish Imagination” of John Ruskin and George 
MacDonald: Introductory Speculations
John Pennington
         he narrator of Lilith, Mr. Vane, while encountering the 
strange realm of fairyland, remarks: “I was lost in a space larger than 
imagination . . .” (35). Such a claim seems appropriate when describing the 
proliferation of fantasies and fairy tales during the Victorian period. One 
need only look at the impressive anthologies of fairy and fantasy litera­
ture catalogued in Jonathan Cott’s Beyond the Looking Glass, Jack Zipes’s 
Victorian Fairy Tales, and Michael Patrick Hearn’s Victorian Fairy Tale Book 
to realize the magnitude of the undercurrent of literature that seems to have 
captured the Victorian imagination. Indeed, the Victorian readers of fantasy 
and fairy tales were cast into a “space larger than imagination” (Lilith 35).
 The Victorians became enthralled with the “classic” fairy tales, 
particularly those by Grimms and Anderson: Edgar Taylor’s trans lation of 
the Grimms’ tales—German Popular Stories (1823; 1826; and numerous 
subsequent editions)—and Anderson’s Wonderful Stories for Children (1846) 
cemented the fairy tale in the Victorian imagination. John Ruskin’s original 
fairy tale, The King of the Golden River (written in 1841, but published in 
1851), a reworking of vari ous Grimm tales, symbolically legitimatized fairy 
discourse for Victorian writers and readers. Michael Patrick Hearn contends 
that “the coronation of Victoria in 1837 marked the arrival of a golden age 
for the literary British fairy tale” (xix), a boon for the fairies so to speak. 
Even Dickens and Thackeray wrote original fairy tales. In fact, Harry Stone 
in Dickens and the Invisible World suggests that fairy tales are at the heart 
of Dickens’s greatest nov els, generating the “fundamental characteristics of 
his art: the impulse toward fantasy, transformation, and transcendence” (xi). 
It would be naive, however, to assume that the popular accept ance of fairy 
tales—classic and original—was a result of a benign belief in the simple 
entertainment value of the tales. Fairy tales, a part of nursery education, were 
viewed as instructional primers for children. In Fairy Tales and the Art of 
Subversion, Jack Zipes contends that a fairy tale must be seen as “a symbolic 
act” (6) [end of page 55] grounded in historical awareness. The “fairy 
tale assumes great importance,” argues Zipes, “because it reveals how social 
T
mores and values were induced in part through literature and consti tuted 
determinants in the rearing of an individual child” (33). The fact that Wilhelm 
Grimm continually revised the Grimms’s col lection “to make the tales 
more proper and prudent for bourgeois audiences” (Zipes in Brothers xxvi) 
reinforces the claim that fairy tales were viewed as instructional documents. 
But many of the Grimm tales were morally ambiguous and often filled with 
ex treme violence. Humphrey Carpenter argues that “fairy tales . . . occupy 
a moral no­man’s land . . . . [A]s a vehicle for organised moral instruction 
the fairy story leaves a lot to be desired” (4). Consequently, the Victorians 
hit an impasse: they admired fairy tales, though they desired a collection of 
tales that promoted moral and social virtues. A mid­century manifesto on the 
fairy tale—Charles Dickens’s “Frauds on the Fairies”—helps put all this in 
per spective. Published on October 1, 1853, the essay satirically at tacks those 
writers—particularly George Cruikshank—who tam pered with traditional 
fairy discourse to promote moral agendas. Dickens’s retelling of Cinderella 
finds the waif joining the Juvenile Bands of Hope, marrying the Prince who 
is “completely covered from head to foot with Total Abstinence Medals” 
(440), dedicating her life to moderation and abstinence, and, of course, living 
happily ever after. 
 To understand the Victorian fairy tale, then, we must understand the 
Victorian attitude toward these tales—and toward children. John Ruskin, the 
greatest Victorian art and social critic, and George MacDonald, arguably the 
greatest writer of original fairy tales during the nineteenth century, somewhat 
reveal how the Victorians viewed the fairy tale. By ex amining these two 
friends we see that two attitudes toward the fairy tale contended with each 
other: the conservative and the radical.
 Ruskin, the conservative, paradoxically argued for the need to 
preserve fairy tales unblemished by overt moral doctrine, yet sug gested 
that children need shielding from the ugliness of the world. Ruskin, in 
effect, recalls the Golden Age of childhood—as mir rored in the fairy 
tales—recapturing in memory the childish im­ [56] agination lost to the 
experienced world. MacDonald, on the other hand, the radical, argued for 
the inherent goodness and vitality of the childish imagination, an imagination 
that all should possess. Whereas Ruskin relegates the fairy tale to the nursery 
and to fond memories of childhood, MacDonald liberates these tales by rock­
ing the cradle. He uses the fairy tale to remythologize the nine teenth century 
by creating a “space larger than imagination” that will embrace childhood 
innocence, adult experience, and the re ligious imagination. MacDonald 
argues for the social and aes thetic qualities of these tales.
 Before discussing Ruskin and MacDonald, we should return once 
more to Charles Dickens and his attack on the “Frauds on the Fairies,” 
for Dickens seems to embody a seemingly ambiguous and somewhat 
contradictory attitude toward fairy tales, which aligns him with Ruskin. 
Dickens argues:
         In a utilitarian age, of all other times, it is a matter of grave 
         importance that Fairy tales should be respected . . . . 
         [I]t becomes doubly important that the little books them selves, 
         nurseries of fancy as they are, should be preserved. To preserve 
         them in their usefulness, they must be as much preserved in 
         their simplicity, and purity, and innocent extravagance, as if 
         they were actual fact. (435)
Yet Dickens also suggests that such tales do have a specific purpose since 
their “usefulness” is to teach children “forbearance, courtesy, consideration 
for the poor and aged, kind treatment of animals, the love of nature, 
abhorrence of tyranny and brute force—many such good things have been 
first nourished in the child’s heart by this powerful aid” (435). Dickens’s own 
Cinderella most certainly promotes these virtues. When directly attacking 
Cruikshank, Dickens writes: “He has no greater moral justifica tion in altering 
the harmless little books than we should have in altering his best etchings” 
(436). These “harmless little books,” Dickens argues, need preservation 
both for the child and for adults because they have “greatly helped to keep 
us, in some sense, ever young, by preserving through our worldly ways 
one slender track not overgrown with weeds, where we may walk with 
children, sharing their delights” (435). Nostalgia is perhaps the best word 
to describe Dickens’s attitude toward fairy tales. For Dickens the fairy tale 
recalls childhood innocence through the childish imagi nation, a tonic to the 
industrial revolution and the ills created by it. Harry Stone argues that after 
“Frauds on the Fairies” the “fairy tale now stood at the center of [Dickens’s] 
imaginative and social be­ [57] liefs; it was a shorthand way of referring to 
and dramatizing those beliefs” (15).
 Ruskin, who uses nostalgic terms to define the fairy tale, be longs 
in the Dickensian camp. In his autobiography Praeterita, he admits that 
he was raised on fairy stories, and so it seems consist ent that his first work 
of literature was a fairy tale. Written when he was just twenty-two—and 
written for the young girl Effie Gray, whom he would eventually marry—The 
King of the Golden River was a reworking of various Grimm tales. In his 
autobiography, however, Ruskin had little to say positively about the tale:
          [It] was written to amuse a little girl; and being a fairly good 
          imitation of Grimm and Dickens, mixed with a little true Alpine 
          feeling of my own, has been rightly pleasing to nice children, 
          and good for them. But it is totally value less, for all that. I can 
          no more write a story than compose a picture. (303)
Ruskin’s negative view may reflect his belief that the tale was actually 
“valueless” because it was merely “pleasing to nice chil dren, and good 
for them,” not on the same level as his “great” works for adults: Modern 
Painters, The Stones of Venice, and Unto this Last to name a few. Thus 
it seems quite ironic that scholars see in The King of the Golden River 
many themes that anticipate Ruskin’s career. Suzanne Rahn, for example, 
argues that “for students of Ruskin [the fairy tale] has value as an early and 
characteristic articulation of his social and economic philosphy” (1).
 When we look at other documents by Ruskin on fairy tales we see 
a similar pattern. In “Fairy Stories” (1868), written as a Pref ace to German 
Popular Stories illustrated by George Cruikshank, Ruskin announces that 
he is reluctant to eulogize the fairy tales “because there is in fact nothing 
very notable in these tales, un less it be their freedom from faults which for 
some time have been held to be quite the reverse of faults, by the majority 
of readers” (233). Much of Ruskin’s agenda in the Preface is to sup port the 
Grimm tales by renouncing, like Dickens, the plethora of satiric, moral, 
and didactic fairy, tales invading the nursery (many of which, ironically, 
Cruikshank also wrote and illustrated).
 One fault that Ruskin finds with these modern, tampered tales is that 
they are addressed to “children bred in school­rooms and draw ing­rooms, 
instead of fields and wood . . .” (233), and he chastises the satiric tale because 
“children should laugh, but not mock . . . . They should be taught, as far as 
they are permitted to concern themselves with the characters of those around 
them, to seek faith­ [58] fully for good, not to lie in wait maliciously to 
make themselves merry with evil . . .” (234). In fact, Ruskin argues that the 
modern fairy tales, unlike the Grimm tales, have lost “the simplicity of [the] 
conception of love . . . [which] in the heart of the child, should represent 
the most constant and vital part of its being; which ought to be the sign of 
the most solemn thoughts that inform its awakening soul and, in one wide 
mystery of pure sunrise, should flood the zenith of it heaven, and gleam on 
the dew at its feet . . .” (234). This is Ruskin getting nostalgic.
 Furthermore, fairy tales must teach the lesson of love without turning 
into “the hieroglyph of an evil mystery” (234), he claims, because “a child 
should not need to choose between right and wrong. It should not be capable 
of wrong; it should not conceive of wrong” (235). Ironically, Ruskin calls 
for a fairy tale that teaches children strict moral lessons, albeit tra ditional 
or “universal” morals. But Dick ens and Ruskin actually condemn the moral 
fairy tales not because they are primarily didactic, but be cause they are not 
artistic, and yet they seem to approve of the yoking of the artistic and the 
didactic.
 The “classic fairy tales” of Ruskin’s youth are those which measure 
up to his standards; he believes these tales provide a clear moral function:
          Children so trained have no need of moral fairy tales; but they 
          will find in the apparently vain and fitful courses of any 
          tradition of old time, honestly delivered to them, a teaching 
          for which no other can be substituted, and of which the 
          power cannot be measured; animating for them the material 
          world with inextinguishable life, fortifying them against the 
          glacial cold of selfish science, and pre paring them submissively, 
          and with no bitterness of as tonishment, to behold, in later years, 
          the mystery—divinely appointed to remain such to all human 
          thought—of the fates that happen alike to the evil and the good. 
          (“Fairy Stories” 235­36)
For Ruskin, the fairy tale becomes a multi­vitamin, a bowl of high­energy 
breakfast cereal chockfull of nutrients to build strong bones [59] and 
moral fiber. Yet there seems to be an inconsistency in Ruskin’s claims: he 
favors the traditional fairy tales over the modern moral, satiric, and didactic 
tales, but he also seems to suggest that the fairy tale must properly guide 
children. Submissively is the key word in the above quotation; Ruskin finds 
that children must be submis sive to the tale, which will teach them proper 
ways of knowing the world. Consequently, Ruskin’s arguments against the 
modern tales are used to defend the classic tales and sound quite in line with 
Dickens’s claim in “Frauds on the Fairies.” 
 We can see a similar strain in the es say “Fairy Land: Mrs. Allingham 
and Kate Greenaway,” which Ruskin deliv ered as Lecture IV in The Art of 
England series. An adamant admirer of Greenaway’s drawing of young, inno­
cent Victorian girls, Ruskin saw in her work a return to childhood innocence 
that recalled his fond memories of the Grimm tales and the Arabian Nights. 
Children need their childish imagina tion to play freely: “One of the most 
curious proofs of the need to children of this exercise of the inventive and 
believing power . . . you will find in the way you destroy the vitality of a 
toy to them, by bring ing it too near the imitation of life” (329). To Ruskin, 
“the child falls in love with a quiet thing, with an ugly one—nay, it may be, 
with one, to us, totally devoid of meaning” (329). Notice how Ruskin’s adult 
imagination is separate from the childish imagina tion. Furthermore, Ruskin 
concludes that the art of Allingham and Greenaway “intends to address only 
childish imagination, and . . . to entertain with grace” (332).
 In general, we can see that Ruskin has an ambiguous—even a 
contradictory—theory of fairy tales: he respects them in their sim plicity as 
tales of beauty to inspire the childish imagination; how ever, he believes that 
children benefit because the tales have little meaning beyond beauty—they 
are in a sense quite useless. Ruskin seems hesitant to put much stock in the 
mere qualities of the child; he looks with nostalgia on childhood as lost 
innocence in an expe rienced world. Thus the fairy tale has an archaeological 
interest as a museum of childhood. George Landow argues that Ruskin 
felt “the most valuable, most educational, most moral function of art is 
[60] simply to be beautiful . . . . [He] believes that exercising the young 
imagination is itself a most valuable purpose” (34). If this is true, then 
it seems ironic that Ruskin did not defend fairy tales more aggressively. 
Landow even links Ruskin with Dickens: “like Dick ens, Ruskin works 
within a moral and philosophical tradition which held that feeling and 
imagination play, and should play, crucial roles in moral decision; so that to 
develop the imagination is to develop a mature human mind” (34). Though 
Landow’s comments seem valid, Ruskin’s and Dickens’s commentaries on 
fairy tales remain somewhat ambiguous since they are hesitant to argue for 
a complete freedom of the childish imagination. Ruskin and Dick ens are not 
wholeheartedly Wordsworthian.
 When we turn to George MacDonald, we see an attitude that both 
contrasts and “completes” Ruskin’s and Dickens’s. Though Ruskin and 
MacDonald began their careers writing fairy tales, only MacDonald framed 
his canon with them—Phantastes (1858) to Lilith (1895)—suggesting 
that MacDonald invested much energy in Faery. Ironically, the bulk of 
MacDonald’s fiction is traditional triple-decker realistic novels and, with 
the exception of Alec Forbes of Howglen (1865) and a few others, rather 
forgetta ble, if not downright embarrassing. C. S. Lewis, the great admirer 
and popularizer of MacDonald, admits that MacDonald was “seduced” into 
writing realistic novels because of the money.
 MacDonald, in fact, complains about his career as a writer of fairy 
tales. On one occasion he challenged an Ath enaeum review of Phantastes 
because the reviewer called “it an allegory and judge[s] or misjudge[s] 
it accordingly— as if nothing but an allegory could have two meanings” 
(Greville MacDonald 297). On another occasion MacDonald, discussing 
his editorship of Good Words for the Young, remarks that falling readership 
may be attributed to the fact that “there is too much of what he [Strahan, the 
publisher] calls the fairy element. I have told him my story [The Princess 
and the Gob lin] shall be finished in two months more . . . . I know it is as 
good work of the kind as I can do, and I think will be the most complete 
thing I have done . . .” (Greville MacDonald 411­12). Thus we see that [61]
MacDonald takes his fairy­tale writing quite seriously, for the fairy tale is an 
artistic object worthy to be measured against the literary canon of the day.
 Even though Ruskin and MacDonald were intimate friends, Ruskin 
has little to say about MacDonald’s fairy tales. One com ment Ruskin makes 
is a telling one, however. After having read “The Light Princess,” Ruskin 
writes to MacDonald:
          I have been lingering over the Light Princess, trying to analyze 
          the various qualities of mind you show in it. I am certain that 
          it will not do for the public in its present form:—owing first, to 
          some of your virtues;—that you see too deeply into things to 
          be able to laugh nicely—you cannot laugh in any exuberant 
          or infectious manner—and the parts which are intended to be 
          laughable are weak. Secondly, it is too long and there is 
          a curious mixture of tempers in it—of which we will talk—it 
          wants the severest compres sion. Then lastly, it is too amorous 
          throughout—and to some temperaments would be quite 
          mischievous—You are too pure­minded yourself to feel this—
          but I assure you the swimming scenes and love scenes would 
          be to many chil dren seriously harmful—Not that they would 
          have to be cut out—but to be done in a simpler and less telling 
          way. We will chat over this. Pardon my positive way of stating 
          these things—it is my inferiority to you in many noble things 
          which enables me to feel them and prevents you. (qtd. in Raeper 
          222)
Is this Ruskin as Mrs. Barbauld? As Mrs. Trimmer? As Mr. Bowdler? As Mr. 
Cruikshank?
 Ruskin’s negative critique of “The Light Princess” is consistent with 
his conservative view of the fairy tale, for such tales should not tax children 
but present them with a beautiful world devoid of strife. Perhaps in answer 
to Ruskin’s criticism MacDonald wrote “The Fantastic Imagination” (1893), 
a prefatory essay for an American edition of “The Light Princess” and his 
apologia for the fairy tale. MacDonald argues that the fairy tale is a powerful 
mode of writing for both child and adult. Unlike Ruskin, MacDonald has 
complete trust in the child. Arguing that a fairy tale must have vitality and 
truth (abstract signifiers), he suggests that fairy tales work best when readers 
ac­ [62] tivate them and make them personally concrete. In essence, he 
argues for a reader­response theory of the fairy tale: “Everyone . . . who 
feels the story will read its meaning after his own nature and development: 
one man will read one meaning in it, another will read another” (316). 
Anticipating a negative response to such an assertion, MacDonald admits that 
“it may be better that you should read your meaning into it” (316) because 
“a genuine work of art must mean many things; the truer its art, the more 
things it will mean” (317). Unlike Dickens and Ruskin, who view the fairy 
tale as a gentle guide to specific qualities of goodness—which includes 
beauty—MacDonald believes that the child, the reader, must engage the text 
and help create meaning. In that “space larger than imagination,” the reader 
can write his or her own meaning on the basic framework of the fairy tale. 
Ruskin and Dickens seem to paint the child as a passive receiver of fairy 
tales; MacDonald sees the child as an active par ticipant, filling such roles as 
Sleeping Beauty, Prince Charming, or the Wicked Witch.
 Consequently, to MacDonald the fairy tale is impressionistic; it 
intends “to wake a meaning” (317), “to wake things up that are [within]” 
(319); it “seizes you and sweeps you away” (319). Not surprisingly, 
MacDonald equates the fairy tale to the sonata, to the aeolian harp, and to 
nature (all Romantic metaphors): “Na ture is mood­engendering, thought­
provoking: such ought the sonata, such ought the fairytale to be” (320). 
Meaning, then, be comes secondary to the spirit that permeates the fairy tale 
and engages the reader, for meaning is mood, is feeling, is the sense that the 
fairy tale speaks personally to each reader. Eventually MacDonald makes 
his major claim about the fairy tale audience: “But indeed your children are 
not likely to trouble you about meaning. They find what they are capable 
of finding, and more would be too much. For my part, I do not write for 
children, but for the childlike, whether of five, or fifty, or seventy-five” (317). 
The child is indeed the father of humankind. Thus MacDonald’s concept 
of the fairy tale includes both child and adult: the fairy tale continues to 
influence the child and adult because each will engage the text according to 
his or her individual need. [63] Jack Zipes argues that MacDonald “often 
turned the world upside­down and inside­out . . . to demonstrate that society 
as it existed was based on false and artificial values . . . . Fairy-tale writ ing 
itself becomes a means by which one can find the golden key for establishing 
harmony with the world—a Utopian world, to be sure, that opens our eyes to 
the ossification of a society blind to its own faults and in justices” (Subversion 
xxiii). In the hands of MacDonald, the fairy tale has pro found moral and 
social clout, not be cause an adult could identify with ap parent themes, nor 
because a child could find a concrete moral for guid ance, but because the 
adult and child—the childlike in all—could immerse him self or herself in the 
once­upon­a­time land where all are equal, where all have potential, where 
anything is pos sible, and where all can stand on equal footing and help create 
meaning, help effect change. That Ruskin—and even Dickens—would value 
the fairy tale for its simplicity, for its nostalgic beauty, for its ability to simply 
exercise the imagination, instead of for its creative and social potential, 
clouds their insights into the powerful creative potential of the tales. Only 
George MacDonald, with his purer view of the childish imagination, could 
create unabashedly those haunting spaces larger than imagination.
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